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Sunday, March 05, 2000, 9:12 AM; 8-11-00

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TITLES (FOR A BOOK LIKE THIS)

AND THEMES, REFLECTIONS ON MORAL CHOICES AND RESISTANCE

[Franz Jagerstetter, Austrian draft resister): "This train is going to hell." He dreams of the Nazi movement, as a train being boarded by many, gaily; then hears a voiceÖ. He resolves to refuse conscription, in 1938; executed August 9, 1943.]

Train to Hell

Road to Hell

[is paved with good intentions! See the "good intentions" of the "honorable men" (Colby);

We undertook Vietnam for the noblest motives, noble cause (Westmoreland, Carter? Reagan;) altruistic motives; some truth to this, as in Kosovo, other "humanitarian interventions" (Humanitarian bombing); Hypothesis: most mass killing is done with good intentions, and good conscience; it is believed to be justified (even obligatory) by those directing it and those executing it; or at least the latter feel justified and obligated to obey orders (see dialog before Agincourt, in Henry V: But if the war be not just...)

(This may be less commonly true of individual killing, non-directed/ordered, non-organized); the focus on these as the arena of moral choice, of problematic killing, of evil action, is misleading as to the motives of and physical and moral dangers of mass killing, both of military and of non-combatants, the moral problems raised by the latter and the challenge to resistance.)

[8-11-00: One must challenge, resist, disavow, disobey, contradict: not only certain orders of one's superiors, but their rationale, their "good motives," which they sincerely believe, even if their belief is self-serving, conformist, unthinking, uncritical, unquestioningÖ Thus, to Question Authority is not only to question what They order and say, but what they believe, value, and tell others to believe and value.]

Getting Off the Train to Hell

...the Killing Train. (Michael Albert?)

Is This the Road to Hell?

[Why does it take 50 million sperm to find one egg? Because they won't ask directions.]

[What is the way to Hell?

Which way to Hell?

Can you tell me: How do I get to Hell?]

Daddy, Are We Lost? (Shut up, I explained. Ring Lardner.)

Directions From Hell

Leaving Hell

Escape from Hell.

The Gates of Hell

Storming the Gates of Hell

Sleepwalking to Hell

Blocking the Road to Hell

Blocking the Tracks to Hell

Blowing the Bridge to Hell

[See Clinton's: Bridges to the 21st Century)

[See Hemingway's Robert Jordan: waiting, dying, to blow up a bridge to be crossed by fascists.

[See Sartre's Mathieu: praying to hold on, firing, to slow the Nazi advance for just fifteen minutes.]

[Horatious at the bridge: confronting the Tuscan army, alone, to stop their advance on the bridge, long enough for the bridge to Rome to be collapsed. A poem that inspired Liddy, as well as me.]

[Thermopylae: Go, stranger, and tell the Lacedaemonians, that we lie here, obedient to their laws.

Go tell it to the Spartans (early movie about Vietnam, with Burt Lancaster)

[Housman:...]"The King with half the East at heel is marched from lands of morning/ His archers drink the rivers up, their spears benight the air/ And he that stays shall die for naught, and home there's no returning./The Spartans on the sea-wet rocks sat

down and combed their hair.” (My image of the preparations of those, on May 1, 1971, preparing to sit down in the streets of Washington.) (formerly, an image for a Marine: who revered the story of Captain Barber’s stand at Fox Hill, 1950, guarding the withdrawal route of the First and Fifth Marines; one regiment commanded by Chesty Puller: “There’s Chinese to our right flank; and to our left flank. We have Chinese to our front; and to our rear...They can’t all get away this time.” O.P. Smith (?): “Retreat, hell; we’re advancing in another direction.”]

Advancing in Another Direction

Retreat from Hell

Break-out from Hell

Freezing Hell

[Thursday, January 8, 2009:

Hell on Earth

Drifting to Hell (Einstein/Harold Oram

: drift towards unparalleled catastrophe]

Drifting to catastrophe

Madness Rules

Madmen in Authority [Keynes]

Crazy Apes

Mad rationality (Lewis Mumford, cited by Roszak in Elders, p. 27); rational madness;]

[My draft speech for July 1965: how long will we persist in our aims and effort in Vietnam? “Till hell freezes over.”

(Edward Ellsberg’s book: Hell on Ice.)

(Notion, of liberal palliatives, moderating the race to the abyss [Clinton’s small ABM system vs. Bush’s large ABM system]: Bringing ice-cubes to hell. Bringing Ice to Hell)

[“Then it was as if an ax had split my head, and my heart broke open. But what

had really happened was that my life had split in two. I thought, we are eating our young, devouring them, using them....in Vietnam, and on the barricades at home."

[William Bundy, on why Nixon wouldn't pursue any more Cambodias: "The kids won't let him."]

A Split Life

Life Split in Two

Ax to the Head

My Heart Broke Open

Eating Our Young.

[Observer flying over Hiroshima (Robert Sherwood): "We are cannibals."]

[The human problem (see my notes on the back of Delbanco's "The Death of Satan"): our species lacks an instinctive inhibitions against killing our own, against killing other human animals. [Contrary to Erikson, who ascribes this to our "pseudo-speciation," defining others as less-than-human so we can kill them: We are the species (along with very few others: some ants, perhaps chimpanzees) that does not need to do that; We can kill others we perceive as being of our own species (e.g. "enemies of the state," those who have "wronged" us or threaten us]. Killing other humans is, rather, a "choice" for us, a matter of "free will," a matter for calculation of costs and benefits and comparison of alternative courses of actions and desired outcomes. This is also true of mass killing, massacre of civilians; and of "use" (sic) of nuclear weapons, omnicide, the destruction of nations (see interchange on instructions for Seaborn by Lodge, May 1965) (despite General Lee Butler's point in the recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that no should have the right or the capability, nor should contemplate, to destroy a nation: hence need to abolish nuclear weapons).

Killing other humans, even massacre, is something which can be ordered, and obeyed, by humans: or not. That is, this is a choice: to the extent that obeying authority--or even giving certain orders, for a leader with "obligations"--is a choice, not a reflex, a compulsion. Hypothetical ethical principle (which I perceived on September 30, 1969, after reading about the Special Forces Murder Trial being cancelled): Obeying (or issuing, or passing on) orders to kill--or to lie--should always be perceived as a choice, a consequential and accountable moral choice, not an "absolute obligation," a "compulsion" (which "leaves one no choice"). This is true even when the orders are accompanied by extreme threat ("pain of death, immediate, painful"), even of a degree that would be regarded legally as "assault" ("gunpoint"). A practical exception might be: during a process of physical torture. (Sister Diana Ortiz was forced to press a knife into another victim, during her torture in Guatemala).

See Herman Kahn: "It may or may not be the right thing to do, to kill 100 million

people. But to kill 100 million people without thinking is always wrong." (His argument against a system that permits or makes more likely accidental nuclear war.)

Himmler: "All of us here [SS officers at Posen, 1943] have seen the bodies; have seen 50 bodies, 100 bodies, 500 bodies. That we have seen such things and--with a few exceptions due to human weakness--have remained decent: that is our triumph. That is a page of glory in our history, that has never been written and is never to be written." See Townsend Hoopes, on "best and brightest," and on LBJ: though he was a "volatile man" (what was he referring to? What did he know?), "he was not an evil man, like Hitler." Look hard at the choices he actually made, the "costs" and the benefits pursued, including likelihood of achieving them or of suffering the political outcomes he feared if he didn't bomb Vietnam.. How different were his subordinates from Eichmann--see recent publication of his diary--or Speer? Is this really an extreme, purely rhetorical comparison?

Another way of defining the human problem: the lack [or unreliability] of [or, to put it positively, hopefully, the need to achieve] an inclusive enough concern for other humans, beyond family and tribe, beyond organization and nation: a recognition of family-hood, or species-hood, which would at the least strongly inhibit killing. (That is a limited, but perhaps crucial, meaning of "love," as in "Love thy neighbor as thyself"; or "All we need is love" or "We must love one another or die." Feel/show concern for thy neighbor. A concern--based on (but not identical with, perhaps!) recognition of common nature, common family/species ("we are all brothers and sisters, cousins")--a consideration for other's feelings and right to life. (Ha! Major political issue of the day in US: does this "Right to Life" extend above all, or only, to fetuses? To all fetuses, or to none, or to some? [August 2000: Buchanan has just attacked Bush's acceptance speech as having been silent on the rights of the unborn.] (See new book on longevity of practice of infanticide, among other animals and among humans).

[See ethical vegetarians, who extend this to other or all animals.]

[See Delbanco, *Death of Satan*, p. 194: Faust wants Mephistopheles to "clear out an old couple whose cottage stands on a spot that he, Faust, covets as a building site: That aged couple should have yielded/ I want their lindens in my grip,/ Since these few trees that are denied me/ Undo my worldwide ownership/...hence is our soul upon the rack,/ To feel, amid plenty, what we lack." [First Noble Truth]

Faust is loudly indignant when he learns that Mephisto, having taken his wishes seriously, has killed the old couple and burned their house to the ground. But the offense, we suspect, is not the deed so much as the tactless fact of his being told about it. He wants not so much that the old man and woman should have been spared as not to know what was done with them." (p. 194)

[Note that I perceived Faust's motives in myself in trying to kill the inhabitant (creator) of the conch shell I wanted for an ornament and souvenir. It was resisting my wishes, my will; struggling to stay alive and to live in the house it had built. This little,

impudent rebel, defying me (though I didn't get angry...). And my sudden recognition: By what right was I killing it, taking its home? For what? To meet what urgent necessity, obligation? (In what crisis, for me?) (Did this create a crisis for me? A crise de conscience? A moral crisis? A sense of choice, responsibility: one path leading to hell?)

[Last night, someone supposed that it was misleading or mistaken to say--like Hersh, yesterday--that I had made a "moral choice," that my story was how I came to make a "moral decision." Her supposition was that I had, over a period of time, changed, become a person who "had to do what I did," who "could no longer" act in a previous way (no longer wanted? "could not?").

[See my notation in my notebook on September 23d, 1969, a week away from copying the Pentagon Papers, at the seminar on Ecology and Nonviolence at the Institute for the Study of Nonviolence, led by Burt Wallrich): "I am changing. How did this begin?"]

But: that's not the way it felt, with copying the PP. That always felt like a choice; a tactical choice; not something I "had to do, I had no choice, something that had to be done." It didn't likely enough to contribute to stopping the war under Nixon, to be compelling in that way. It often didn't look like the best use of my time at the moment, even when the situation was most urgent. I postponed, put it aside, left it incomplete for periods: not primarily for reasons of risk. (Though certain decisions reflected consideration of risk).

When I did turn back to the work of getting it out, it was usually not because of new circumstances that made it look more likely to be effective or more appropriate--on the contrary, my estimate of its probable effectiveness or its appropriateness was in steady decline from November 1969 on--but because of events or personal examples of courage and sacrifice that intensified my feeling that I had to do something, something more than I was doing, I had to be willing to accept more risk, even for small prospects of success.

For that matter, it was not the copying and releasing of the Pentagon Papers that was most consequential: though it supported the impact of what was consequential (copying NSSM-1 and giving it to Mathias, then later to Gravel), just as I'd hoped it would support other actions that I expected to be more relevant: testimony in hearings by former officials, questioning of current officials, a sense in the public that what I was claiming was the current policy might be true, because it would be in the pattern of the past as revealed in the PP (that didn't happen as much as I hoped!). In fact, none of these latter particular things happened! No hearings. And no significant stimulation to the antiwar movement, no particular use by the surviving antiwar movement (which was running down sharply, and was only a remnant already in mid-1971) of the Pentagon Papers one way or another. Some effect on stimulating imitation, but on the whole this was smothered. (Disclosure of drugs and corruption by Embassy counsel...). (Major exceptions: whatever impact my disclosure had on: revelation of Cambodian bombing;

earlier, revelation of bombing of North Vietnam (Lavelle); disclosure of tilt to Pakistan (did it help Anderson induce Radford (?) to give him documents? He said so. CHECK)

However, without the example of my publication of the PP, Nixon's knowledge that I had copied NSSM-1 and given it to Mathias (as I had given the Wheeler Report to Bobby Kennedy; and later gave the JFK cables on Diem to Church and to Ted Kennedy, not to Hersh) would not have worried him so. He could have figured that I wouldn't have the nerve actually to put out NSSM-1 and other documents I might have, facing the threat of prosecution; so he didn't have to take extra-legal measures to stop me. But since I was already under indictment for the PP, a prospect that evidently hadn't stopped me, he had to go further.

Nevertheless, unforeseen by me (I started to say, unforeseeably, but that's not so true, if I had thought about it; see the implication that NSSM-1 gave of "a source within the Nixon White House"; and my lawyers' sense that it was much more legally dangerous; but even that focused on the danger for me, not the impact on Nixon, or even the public): the "door that opened when I pushed on it" (impossible to predict, when you push on many doors) was the copying of NSSM-1 and giving it to a Republican Senator (it was almost pure happenstance that it was to a Republican), Mathias. His readiness to be the Republican man on the white horse was admirable--and consequential--but its effect depended also on his cowardice in the end, his fear of being given the Goodell treatment if he were silent about it and then was found out, if he was not cooperative in telling Mitchell. (Otherwise, how would they have known he had it? [8-11-00: On the other hand, if I had given it to a Democratic Senator, especially one running for the Presidency: He would probably have made it public after the Times released the PP; he would have held a press conference, like McGovern or McClosky. That might have been better! It would have gotten NSSM-1 out earlier! And scared Nixon just as much as Mathias did.]

As I said to Wendy in a note with my manuscript on the breakfast meeting with HAK that led to NSSM-1: Without this meeting, without my working on NSSM-1 and subsequently copying it and giving it to Mathias--i.e., had I only copied the PP--Nixon would have stayed in office till the end of his term, and US bombing of NVN would have resumed in April, 1973 and persisted for at least 2 more years; more probably at least 3-1/2 more years (till the end of his term) and quite possibly years longer.

A moral: You can't tell which action will actually prove consequential, or most consequential (in a desirable direction, or in the way you want, or at all, even for bad). A decision (my decision) was crucial: to be ready and willing to do everything I could--non-violent and truthful--that might help, with little or no regard for the costs to me. (Thus, I considered everything that might help; my choice of which to try at a particular point or in what sequence did reflect my best calculations of costs--in effort, attention, ability to do other things--and benefits: but without much attention, the usual concern, for costs to my career or my standing in the Establishment (thus, even, "loss of effectiveness, credibility, access" as an Insider: the usual rationale, with some substance, for rejecting acts that would destroy that status, "aside" from its effects on income and prestige and

comfort; i.e. for rejecting revelations, with documents, that would be seen as "betrayal of trust" of important Insiders). (I first entered this frame of mind in March, 1968: though I didn't yet think in terms of doing "anything," didn't think of putting out the PP with a certainty of prison. Next, in late August 1969; and a final step on September 30, 1969.)

So, the lesson is: one must still calculate; but don't limit yourself to what you judge to be "the" most effective action, even where others involve risk: try many doors, many avenues, including some that involve high risk, even some that involve high risk with little promise of success. (Watch out for traffic: but cross streets!) At the same time (a subsidiary lesson, or caution): Don't try all the approaches that combine high risk with little promise, especially early on: or your efforts won't last very long. (Once you go public, or go to jail, your further efforts are pretty limited, even if not entirely over). Thus, I was wrong to put off revelations like the PP as long as I did from 1961 on, till 1969. I was wrong not to make such revelations in 1961-62, or 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968. (1966 was not much of a candidate for this; I had little opportunity, in Vietnam, and at that point they would have little effect). But I was not wrong in September and October of 1969 (after hearing Kehler, and Halperin) to try to do other things first, that were both less risky and seemed more promising: organizing Establishment opposition, putting out the RAND letter, preparing to testify.

Waking the Sleepers

Asleep at the Wheel

Silence of the Lambs (Clarisse tried to save one lamb from slaughter (after she learned what happened to the lambs; note what happens today to young lambs, veal); as a child, she failed. She wanted this time to save one victim from a serial murderer. I wanted to avert the next million tons of bombs (as dropped under Clifford and Warnke and Halperin and Gelb, in 1968!) (How many Vietnamese civilians died that year? How many Americans? While these well-intentioned people deferred to LBJ's authority--like Humphrey--in their efforts to end the war!)

But virtually no one (including me) did what they could to avert Nixon's victory over Humphrey, starting with Humphrey himself. But in that case, almost no one was aware that it made much difference, in Vietnam. Could they have known this? (How widely known was that part of the Miami Herald revelation of his speech to the Southern delegates in August?) Note that most of the new people Nixon did reveal his secret strategy to, accepted his judgment that it would (or could) work, quickly. (Halperin and I didn't believe this, but we weren't told or supposed to know). Those who would have challenged this, weren't told by him. (Note that even Mort, in his chapter on "What Nixon Learned from Vietnam" in Lake's book, describing the talk to the delegates, nevertheless denies what he believed in 1969: that Nixon's threats in 1969 involved nuclear threats. When did he write that? And why did he deny that? (Probably for

credibility...but he could have just been silent on the point.)

[Mort's memory now--June 2000--is, mistakenly, that he did not deny this then; he thinks he revealed it in the Lake essay.]

Decent Folk

The Crimes of Decent Folk (People) (Men)

[Delbanco: evil as "willed insouciance." Insouciance as "lighthearted unconcern" (not this; a rather positive, playful, pleasant state); nonchalance--cool indifference

[Merriam Webster: nonchalant (from OF, to disregard, from non - chaloir, to concern, from L calere to be warm): "having an air of easy unconcern or indifference [often, to one's own danger or discomfort? Free of anxiety, worries?]

Insouciance: from F, in + soucier, to trouble, disturb): lighthearted unconcern.

Webster's Universal: insouciant: free from concern, worry, or anxiety [not? Free from a sense of responsibility, for past or current or future happenings? Responsibility for changing them, protecting others?] carefree (good! Free from care...) (not, usually meant: free from care for others; but free from worry about oneself).

Nonchalant: coolly unconcerned; indifferent or unexcited.

Nonchalance: cool indifference or lack of concern; casualness. (Again, this seems usually to refer to concern about oneself, danger to oneself, possible cost to oneself; an enviable or admirable quality; neither dictionary associates it with unconcern about others (though one could specify that).)

Say rather: Evil as willed (chosen) total indifference, unconcern about harm likely to be caused to others. (In circumstances where there is great danger to others, of suffering or loss of lives, that might be imposed by or averted by one's own choices of behavior and expression; total unconcern about such consequences or potential consequences to others, unconcern about or lack of consideration to their feelings, dignity (see slavery) suffering, survival.) Hence, use of them solely as means, feeling free to destroy/eliminate/torture them.

Reflections, March 8, 2000, Wednesday, 7:54 AM

[The word "solely" is important here; and "destroy/eliminate/torture/kill." Surely everyone "uses" other people, uses them "in part" as means, prefers others' interest--including one's own, or one's family or team--over theirs, part of the time (or much of the time). And one does not, need not, should not, always feel guilty or even regretful about that, defensive or apologetic, justly accused of "evil" or sin.

But to kill: to eliminate them totally and irreversibly, to will and accomplish the ending/shortening of their life (when they are not close to death by "natural causes," or suffering in a way that causes them to desire death...). (and see: foetus; severely disabled infant (Peter Singer: less than 28 days, or one year; not yet aware of itself as a separate being, with past and future [why is that so morally relevant? Isn't the issue, their ability to feel pain, as with animals (issue of vegetarianism: Singer is vegetarian. (vegan?) See Princeton Alumni Journal)

[July 2000: In the TV docudrama "Nuremberg", the Nuremberg psychologist G--- says to Justice Jackson, having studied the prisoners, that what they have in common (in Rohrschachs: which were generally "normal" for the prisoners, at least for CEO types) is "lack of empathy." He concludes: "Evil is lack of empathy." But I would point to a widely- or universally-shared human trait (not at all confined to those who have behaved, in specific circumstances, like the Nuremberg prisoners): Selective empathy, or lack of empathy: a discriminative capability for empathy, which can be manipulated by Authority or social groups, ordered, directed, authorized, ideologically shaped, socially constructed. A selective and variable, socially influenced, human concern for the suffering of other groups of humans.

Chattel slavery: the "right" to kill, whip, torture, certain humans (one's "possessions"). (See corporal punishment issue, in Britain and US: last week's NYT. Right to beat children, school-boys... (girls?) See ambivalence of those beaten in school toward "masters" who beat them, and toward beating. Fact of having "survived" and "endured" it (bravely; in a way that maintains or enhances the respect of others, and of the beater, and of one's self; like boot camp, initiation--see Skull and Bones, George W. Bush--(youth, childhood!), like a life-threatening illness ("he fought a brave battle against cancer"), combat (also, bonding; suffering together, bravely, being reliable and being able to rely on others to support and "cover" you, even when it endangers them or calls for great alertness: noticing threats, where fire is coming from, staying awake on watch).

But also: identification with aggressor. The beaten spouse or child, or sexually abused child. The association of parental love, dependence, with pain and abuse. The exhilaration of discovering not only that you can survive pain or beating, not only with some dignity and self-respect (Hitler would count the blows he got from his step-father with a rhinoceros-hide whip), but with the respect and love (and continued sense of "guardianship," responsibility for welfare) in one's parent/beater. (Like Skull and Bones, the effect of forced "confession"--e.g. of sexual history--to the group (like communist self-criticism sessions, and Oneida, other intentional communities): the discovery that one is still accepted, valued, "loved," despite/after revelation of one's nature and sins.)

You are a bad enough person, or have behaved badly enough, (at least in their eyes, or perhaps also in your own) as to deserve "six of the best," punishment; yet (especially if you "take it like a man") you can be respected and loved and cared for, a subject of concern: by this person, who is evidently a good person, a forgiver, a good parent (who either "wants above all your own good, your good character and future"--even at the

price of causing you pain now--or else, being human, "can't help himself" (his rage, his drunken furies, his reaction to defiance or frustration). "Better to be punished and forgiven, than to suffer cold indifference." (NYT). The wife who accepts or values her beatings, because afterwards the husband is loving, begs for forgiveness, promises...

Preparation: a childhood that makes this behavior familiar, even comforting (because it was accompanied with a modicum of reassurance, of dependability of care, of affection at times); and gives the "grown-up" a permanent sense that "this is the best you can get, the best to hope for, the best there (actually) is," in life, out there: intermittent love and care, interspersed with indifference, exploitation and cruelty: these associated in the one care-taker. The alcoholic or abusive parent, the parent who demands servility, who exploits...

Delbanco uses the title "The Death of Satan" but he is trying neither to resuscitate the notion of "Satan" nor deploring or noting his (His?) "death." Rather, he is trying to resuscitate the sense of what has been known as "evil" or "sin"--in a world where "God is dead" and (therefore?) "Satan is dead."

It's an interesting notion that the death of God entails the death of Satan: in a supposedly monotheistic culture (actually, always dualistic, Manichean, Zoroastrian, Gnostic). It is easier in many ways to believe in Satan than to believe in God; and polls show that more people believe in Satan than believe in God. I.e. a God that is simultaneously all-powerful and all-good (which is, in logic, inconsistent with belief in Satan, though most religious people who believe in Satan live with this inconsistency, as double-think).

(Yet, if you don't think in terms of omnipotence and monotheism, you can acknowledge the mysterious "ubiquity" ("more than chance can explain, or evolution?") of goodness, beauty, courage (wisdom, caring...): love. See my parting comment to the Sakharovs: He had said, on the stairway: "Life is tragical. They say it is beautiful, but it is really tragical." I said: "Yes, there is tragedy. But there is also courage, and love. And you two exemplify that, your courage and your love." There were tears in my eyes, and my voice was rough. Outside the door, Sakharov kissed me goodbye on the mouth: the first time I'd felt that from a man. So if Satan exists, then God also exists. (Like Satan, of limited presence and powers).

But what Delbanco really addresses is: How to explain, maintain awareness of, recognize, and respond to "evil, sin" in a world without a transcendent Devil (or God: to define "evil and sin" as defiance of God, disobedience to God, turning away from (?) God, violating His laws, refusing his love: or refusing to love His children...). And he wants to explain, recognize: the "death"/disappearance/erosion of the sense of Evil, Sin, a loss he regrets and wants in some way to reverse or compensate for. (He doesn't seem (?) to recognize the problematic nature of that concept, even though he describes its use to characterize the "other," the alien, the disobedient, the heretic...

See the debate this week over McCain's charge that Falwell and Robertson represent the

"forces of evil" he is fighting, intolerance and dogmatism; whereas Bob Jones' University doggedly regards the Pope as the Anti-christ and Catholicism as evil, Catholics as sinners doomed to eternal hell-fire, because they claim salvation by works and by "dogma," instead of recognizing salvation only by faith, belief in Christ and his sacrifice. (Others, in turn, cannot believe in a God who would inflict this permanent torture on people for believing one or these doctrines rather than another.)

Note that what the Bob Jones fundamentalists demand of the Catholics, (and what Catholics who believe in "no salvation outside the one true Church" demand of the Bob Jones' alumni!) is that, to escape eternal punishment, they betray their parents, disassociate themselves from their parents, what their parents believed, and what their brought them up to believe and trust in: to reject and deny these beliefs, which is to defy their parents and refuse what their parents regarded as their most precious gift, a legacy they passed on from their parents and grandparents, their family identity. (See Jesus on the need to leave your parents and follow him). (Among anti-titles: "self-mocking," self-hating; preempting attacks, as in Dick Gregory's title for his memoir, Nigger ("Mamma," he explains to his mother, who is appalled by the title, "Now every time someone uses that word, they're advertising my book.") [Note: get that book. And talk to Gregory.]

Thus, for me: themes of: Informing; Betraying; Quitting; (I wasn't actually accused of Unmanliness, Faggotry: the Life pictures and Marine background helped; the Marine recruiting posters aren't deceptive, it delivers: like a college education).

The Big Snitch.

Tattle-tail. The Informer. (See: The Insider).

The Making of a Traitor.

Knowing When to Quit.

Quitting.

Defector; Renegade.

(The Man Who Came In From the Cold War)

Or simply: Whistle-blower. (See movie: The Insider).

The Source.

On treason, betrayal:

Recall my opening George Seldes' Dictionary of Quotations (in the Green Room of the Kucpinet show in Chicago?) and looking up "treason":

George III: I desire what is right; therefore everyone who disagrees with me is a traitor.

(L'Etat c'est moi. What's good for GM.... What's good for the President... what's good for the US is good for the world...

(see Delbanco on confusion between self and world, what's good for the self... as a basis

of sin, evil...)

Patrick Henry: I am not so old but that I may not again be called traitor. (See my End Note to Domestic Politics 65: LBJ and the Politics of Vietnam.)

Me to interviewer (who has asked: How does it feel to be called traitor?): This country was founded by traitors.

A movement for Independence (Viet Minh; American Revolution; Kosovo; Biafra; Ireland) generates "traitors" (to larger entity, traditional unit, to empire, to "parent country").

See LBJ on "traitors" such as Humphrey in 1968, seeking to separate himself from LBJ's policy; those who left, like Moyers, Goodwin,...

LBJ's charge of "treason" against Nixon and Mitchell for their conniving with Thieu seems, at first glance, to have some substance. Certainly it looks criminal; it "must violate some law"; it was, indeed, interfering with, frustrating, Presidential diplomacy, and specifically efforts (of transcendent importance and value) to end a war; it aimed to prolong a war, and actually did so: does that not define "evil," criminal?

However, looked at more closely, does it really fit the crime of "treason"? Is it giving, in wartime (? a question raised by my act: but let's not quibble, it was a state of war, whether declared or not) "aid and comfort to the enemy"? No! It was against the interests of the enemy, clearly for the benefit of an "ally," and meant to be in the best, long-term interests of the US (as, indeed, those interests had been defined by the Johnson Administration and its predecessor).

In this light, it was LBJ's stopping the bombing and attempts to get negotiations going that were "giving aid and comfort to the enemy," endangering and betraying an ally, betraying our promises to an allied regime and our promises to protect its citizens from Communist tyranny, and (by previous standards) hurting the US (and "betraying a cause": the Cold War competition for prestige and world power). (Later, some in the Nixon camp--Haig?--undoubtedly saw efforts to end the bombing of Hanoi and to accept the negotiated agreement as "treason, betrayal": even by Nixon and Kissinger, and especially those who urged them to do this.)

Actually, the President and Rusk at that moment were in their own eyes just trying to help Hanoi save face in surrendering (by ending the bombing). (But what if that turned out not to be true--as it wasn't? Would they return to bombing? Was there still an "assumption that Hanoi wouldn't take advantage of the bombing": which would be violated if Hanoi maintained resupply, and continued the war? Were Rusk and LBJ taking a chance on this, in hopes of getting a victorious settlement while still in office?--as Nixon charged! "Playing politics with US security interests and commitments"!)

However, those who did want to see the bombing permanently ended, felt this

was not only in Hanoi's interests but also those of the US. I.e. it was not zero-sum; there was an overlapping of interests, some common interest (in ending the bombing, and beyond that, in ending the war, or in ending US participation in it). But to perceive this is, in the eyes of those who see a zero-sum competition, in itself "treason, betrayal, siding with the enemy."

It encourages "quitting," or "letting up...on pressure, coercion, attacks; drawing back from maximum--competitive, destructive --effort, essential to victory." It means--Rusk's greatest fear--encouraging that we are the ones who quit when the enemy was just on the verge of doing so, instead of the reverse. "I'm on our side," Rusk says to the reporters; "Get on the team," Felt says to Halberstam. Successive administrations caution the media that reporting adversely on the GVN or ARVN or US military "successes" is "aiding the enemy," encouraging continued enemy efforts that cost American and allied lives. (The "blood of Americans, of children" is on the hands of "irresponsible" reporters. LBJ tells precisely this to RFK in early 1967, who has been quoted as saying that he detected in France the possibility of a deal with Hanoi, and who is encouraging LBJ to seek a coalition government: You have blood on your hands. RFK: I don't have to take this from you.)

So, peacemaking is almost inevitably seen as betrayal, as treason, treacherous, traitorous. Unless it is of the variety so named by Reagan: MX as "Peacemaker." (And I think he was naming it after a revolver, perhaps the Colt: The Peacemaker (manufacturer's name?), of the West. (The only peaceful Injun is a dead Injun? Fall on Tacitus on US bombing in Vietnam: They have made a desert, and called it peace.)

(Interesting that Reagan didn't call the MX the Peacekeeper; like a Marshal.)

Efforts to end a war are inconsistent with defining/regarding the adversary as an "enemy" in the fullest sense, one that must be dominated or destroyed, that deserves "eternal enmity," one with whom no peace can be permanent, one that cannot be trusted (e.g. to keep any agreement longer than it serves his narrow self-interest in the short-run), one whose continued existence or independence or power is incompatible with our own, or that of those we protect, are committed to, responsible for.

Thus, ending or limiting, moderating, a war, peacemaking, involves "giving aid and comfort" to a previously-recognized enemy. Treason, in the eyes of those who see literally a zero-sum conflict. (Cold Warriors!)

(How about simply averting, deterring, a war-to-the-death (of the enemy), foregoing preventive war? Is this not also recognizing some commonality of interest, denying zero-sum payoffs in the conflict?)

In any case: LBJ's efforts to end a conflict that could, in Nixon's eyes, easily be won, with a little more effort of the right kind, was surely a "betrayal of US interests" (in pursuit of a Democratic victory: corruption); the President was the traitor.

If Nixon's "aid and comfort to an ally...in the interests of the US...against the

interests of our enemies" was not treason, then what was it? A violation of laws that forbid private negotiation with another state, perhaps interference with Presidential negotiations? (I and all my Third Track Diplomacy friends have probably been guilty of that. But we were trying to end an arms race, or a war. Nixon was trying to prolong one. Which was more patriotic? Note the concept of treason to a society (was Ho guilty of that?) or to humanity.)

See LBJ's "madness" as being an inordinate fear of being called names: weak, loser, unmanly, unreliable. (Daley tells LBJ to walk away from Vietnam. LBJ asks him: But won't we be called unreliable? What would you do about that? Daley: I'd stuff those words in my pocket and walk away.) Logevall conjectures that JFK didn't fear these words as LBJ did. (the war hero; like George Bush, Sr. who somehow got the "wimp" label anyway, perhaps for the same reason as war hero McGovern: a prissy, somewhat simpering way of talking; more to the point, like John McCain, a swaggerer and womanizer like JFK. Why doesn't George W. Bush inherit the wimp label (he was a National Guard draft-dodger): perhaps the reputation of his "wild youth," sex and drugs?)

JFK feared and acted to avoid the words "traitor" and "appeaser" before his 1964 election--he wanted a landslide, to erase his "narrow win" (or stolen election) in 1961 (just as LBJ needed a landslide in 1964, to establish his legitimacy; after a stolen election and an assassination in which his friends might be implicated). For that matter, Nixon's victory in 1968 was a squeaker, due to his own illegal interference in negotiations and his denial of it; that didn't seem to bother him, in fact (as it had JFK, or LBJ): he felt he'd earned the office, and had done nothing more than any of his rivals would and did do (that was probably true); nevertheless, he had reason to want a landslide, too, not just a win: in part because he wanted to cement an enduring Republican (or "new party") majority, as part of his legacy.

Note occasions I've been called traitor: The girl after a lecture, at which she asked a question ("how do you justify...?"). I ask, "did I answer your question." She, matter-of-factly, "Oh, I think you're a traitor." (Totally unexpected; my head busts open.)

On talk show, another guest says: "I regard you as a traitor." I take off microphone and walk off the set, complaining to the producer (all this captured live and shown; to the unease of Sheinbaum, who fears I'll be seen as temperamental, unreliable).

Of course, in some contexts one does get used to it, in the sense of expecting it, not being surprised, not having the rage that an unexpected charge evokes. But...
(March 31, 2000)

Memoirs of an Ex-Imperialist

(In From the Cold War.

The Man Who Came In From the Cold War)

(A counter-theme:

I did (and still do!) share the Cold War negative evaluation of a Communist regime (and thus, of a Communist-led "liberation" movement). There was not only plausibility but some validity to this feeling: that such a regime would be, or as a movement would lead to, at least as authoritarian, tyrannical, unresponsive and ultimately exploitative (even, class-based: the New Class) as the colonial or imperial regime it replaced.

I also thought--like Kaysen--that it would be even harder to dislodge or reform, that it would be permanent, as the Soviet Union was thought to be. Kaysen in 1971: "a left authoritarian regime is forever." That was plausible, up till the end of the Cold War: even though some right-wing authoritarian regimes had already proved very durable as well. Though, by 1971, I no longer accepted this as a reason for prolonging our war in Vietnam.

See Amitai Etzioni's article in Foreign Policy, Winter 1992-93, No. 89, on "The Evils of Self-Determination."

Of course, we underrated the authoritarian and minority nature of the regimes we imposed on South Vietnam, their unrepresentative, unresponsive, undemocratic and repressive character. (And the degree of foreign--our own--domination, as indicated not only the nature of the regimes we "supported" or chose, but by our readiness to consider replacing them when they inconveniences us. We were much more aware of their recalcitrance, our own reservations and reticence about intervening: without comparing this to similar phenomena within our own Executive branch, e.g. the problems of civilian control of the Services or MACV.)

Even Chau, who never wanted a communist regime for South Vietnam, who fought them long and who was imprisoned by them for years (and bought his escape as a "boat person"), says (sotto voce), when asked to evaluate the present regime, "better than its predecessors." And he says this despite being very critical of it, and saying that only the can bo (cadres, apparatus) are really better off as a group than before.

But a sense of legitimacy of our effort in suppressing this movement of "self-determination" did derive, with some basis, from this sense that it was heading toward a regime that was no less undemocratic than the present one (and perhaps more immovable).

(Of course, this prospect didn't slow the Western states, led by Germany, from recognizing successor regimes to Yugoslavia, that were even more authoritarian than Tito's Yugoslavia, starting with Croatia. (What is Slovenia like?) Despite the prospect that this would lead to authoritarian states in Serbia, Bosnia...as well as ethnic conflict, massacre, genocide.) (What will Kosovo be like in future, if under the KLA?)

In any case, Vietnam was a place where communist-led self-determination (based on Chinese tactics of protracted conflict) was not to be suppressed, for good or bad: and

in large part, because of characteristics of the preceding regime (and of imperial rule in general). As in China (where the preceding or alternative regime was not colonial, or foreign occupation: though the Communist movement achieved its mobilization and strength, and legitimacy and support, by its prolonged effort against foreign, Japanese, occupation). Or Yugoslavia, where strength and support and credibility were achieved by protracted conflict against brutal foreign occupation, not "colonial" power. (See Soviet Union, after successes against foreign intervention in 1917-20 and civil war; and then, after repelling Nazi invasion). None of these were cases where a Communist regime could be successfully rolled back or averted. (What of North Korea, if no Chinese intervention?)

(Without Cold War policies, how powerful might the Communist Parties of Italy and France have become? What would a Communist-dominated regime--was that at all possible?--have been like? How necessary, and how important, was it to prevent that? Any prospect of that in Japan, immediately postwar or later? (Indonesia? Supposedly yes; actually, given Army, I would think no real prospect). India? Thailand? (Did Thailand--or Malaysia--really matter to us?) (What real security danger, if any, to Australia or New Zealand, under worst-case circumstances? Exactly why were they so concerned, or supportive in Vietnam?) Philippines?!

Titles:

Truth, Declassified.

Declassified Lies.

The Making of a Security Risk

Becoming a Security Risk

("Dan Ellsberg is the most dangerous man in America. He must be stopped, at all costs." That, by the way, is the quotation--cited by Colson, to Hersh--that HAK should be asked about--and basis for it--by Langguth or others, more importantly than the slanders about sex or firing at peasants).

A Dangerous Man

A Dangerous Life

"The Most Dangerous Man"

(Dan Jacobs' warning to Patricia, about meeting me: "He's brilliant, but dangerous." Kissinger to Vann: "Brilliant, none more brilliant. But...unpredictable.") (See bio on Berrigans: Disarmed and Dangerous.)

Turning Dangerous

Turning

(Note Hackworth's: About Face.

Inside Out

Advancing in Another Direction (the Marines at the Chosin Reservoir). ("Retreat, Hell. We're...")

Grabbing the Wheel.

Vs. "civil war" :

(see David Harris, Our War)

Zia Mian: Ellsberg's War

Top Secret--Sensitive

Ending Complicity

Breaking Complicity

The Wrong Side.

April 23, 2000:

Daniel Ellsberg is the most dangerous man in America. He must be stopped at all costs."

HAK to Colson and vets, in Oval Office, June 1971

"The Most Dangerous Man"

"A Dangerous Man"

Daniel and Goliath

In the Liars' Den

Slaying the Bandersnatch

Truth Force

10-3-00: RBE suggests Truth Force, and sub-title: The Truth Shall Make You Free.

Secret Lies, Secret Truths

(secret lies: double accounting/reporting for Cambodian and Laos bombing; OB dispute,

and Wheeler Report; JCS unanimity, recommendations; Rusk on terms of Geneva 1954.)

Breaking Silence (title of a Soviet intelligence defector's memoir? Shevchenko?)

Out of Silence

Truth Power

The Power of Truth

Truth-telling

The Power of Truth-Telling

Xerox Power

Sunday, March 24, 2002

A Time for Disobedience

A Time for Truth

A Time for Truth-telling

[There are times to say "No" to the President, even if you lose your access, your job, your clearance, your career, your reputation: even if you have to go to jail for it.

There are times to tell the truth--and document it--even if

Even if you're breaking an oath, a promise, a contract, an agreement--to keep silence, to keep secrets, to lie, to be "loyal"

Even if it hurts your agency, other causes of yours, your rank, gets you expelled and condemned, even if you lose your friends (and your marriage!) (The fate of WB's)

Speaking Truth to Power? Chomsky, No, speak truth to the people; power knows the truth. But does it know the truth of your real feelings, the strength of them, your sense of morality? Moral truth, as you see it? No.

(It's advice for the CIA; or subordinates, the JCSÖRandÖ; including truth that Power doesn't want to hear. But this assumes a perspective, a set of values, that puts you on the same team as Power; harmony of interests.)

But perhaps it is more important to: Speak truth to the people that Power doesn't want said, doesn't want them to hear. Speak truth that undermines the lies of Power. (not, "the misunderstandings, the errors" of Power; though Chomsky does usually argue as if Power doesn't have areas of ignorance or misunderstanding, bearing on its own

interests).

NC: Build counter-power. Speak truth that mobilizes resistance to Power. (not, myths, lies,Ö)

Late entries:

Patriot

Revealing Secrets

(Daniel and Goliath; Daniel in the Liars' Den; Dan Quixote)

Truth Set Free

Lies and Consequences

Secrets and Lies, or Lies and Secrets

Truth and Secrets

Unauthorized Disclosure (by Tom Clancy)

Thursday, January 8, 2009

From Here to Hell

Memoirs of a Revelationist

Fire and Ice (Frost)

Mapquest/Triptik to Hell

Mass Murder Mystery

Humans: The Killer Apes

Man the Exterminator

The Fall of Civilization

25 January 2009

The reality is that "credibility" of US First-strikes against the SU—for an attack on Europe or for any other reason—is unattainable, for "rational" leadership, except as a (real!) derivative of potential loss of control (I earlier included this under "madness," but it's not best described by this, except for the actual recklessness of allowing this to persist and basing a policy on it: the madness of actual, still-existing otherwise normal and sane leaders and followers, **normal human madness, ordinary madness, the madness of normal humans. (If the supposed behavior of lemmings were real, it would amount to normal lemming madness.** If it's not real, is this behavior **peculiar** to humans? See Easter Island. Might stampeding cattle, or sheep, be led over a precipice?

[NEED both for an Obama ground-up reconsideration of nuclear policy, AND a Congressional review of it, for the first time. IDEALLY: US/Obama glasnost (consult Gorbachev!) on nuclear weapons. OPERATION CANDOR at last!

Forestalling Armageddon!

Transparency of the Gates of Hell. Secrets of Armageddon. (see Bosch's *Inferno*). Ellsberg's *Inferno*. Design for *Inferno*. Inventing Hell. Planning Hell.

27 January 2009

World on Fire

To Set the World on Fire

(see, Pyromaniacs) Pyromania

1-31-9 The Horror (as in Heart of Darkness). The Reader: as students witness the trial of Hanna Schmitz: The intrusion of horror into everyday life. (The ones who see it only once a week do not lose their sense of shock and horror; the hero, who sees it every day, does lose this, becomes numb, impatient, like the prosecutor and judges.)

4 February 2009 How much is too much?

5 February 2009: Lesser evil, necessary evil, Just Evil: or just, evil?

8 February 2009
Hurricanes of Fire

Firestorm War

Saturday, February 28, 2009

The Nuclear Papers
Planning a Hundred Holocausts

The Greater Evil:
US Plans for a Hundred Holocaust

5/16/09 5:39 PM
16 May 2009

The Final Solution
US Planning for a Hundred Holocausts

Twilight at Noon

[Wikipedia, "Nuclear Winter": "In 1982 a special issue of the journal AMBIO was devoted to the possible environmental consequences of nuclear war; it included an article by Paul Crutzen and J. Birks presenting the rudiments of the nuclear winter scenario ("The atmosphere after a nuclear war: Twilight at noon"; Ambio, 1.1, 114-125)."]

Pitch-black at noon

[Carl Sagan, on the effects of the fires of Kuwait, 1993, in the Persian Gulf. Above ref.]

Twilight at Noon
US planning for a Final Solution

A memoir of the nuclear era

US/Russian plans for a Final Solution

The Final Showdown

25 May 2009

Twilight at Noon

Twilight

Years of Twilight

Nuclear Twilight

Twilight of Humanity

Manhattan Project II

Our Last Chance

Tipping Point

25 July 2009:

A Chronicle of Madness: American Planning for a Hundred Holocausts

A Memoir of the Nuclear Era

Memoir of a Nuclear War Planner